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THE POLITICAL (MIS)REPRESENTATION
OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE CENSUS
MING HSU CHEN*
Who is a member of the political community? What barriers to inclusion do immigrants face as outsiders to this political community? This article describes several
barriers facing immigrants that impede their political belonging. It critiques these
barriers not on the basis of immigrants’ rights but based on their rights as current
and future members of the political community. This is the second of two Essays.
The first Essay focused on voting restrictions impacting Asian American and
Latino voters. The second Essay focuses on challenges to including immigrants,
Asian Americans, and Latinos in the 2020 Census. Together, the Essays critique the
exclusion of immigrants from the political community because this exclusion compromises representational equality.
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1 See generally MING HSU CHEN, PURSUING CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENFORCEMENT ERA
(2020).
2 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 298–300 (1968 ed.)
(describing the “right to have rights” as inextricably linked to political membership in a
national entity); see also Leila Faghfouri Azar, Hannah Arendt: The Right to Have Rights,
CRITICAL LEGAL THINKING (July 12, 2019), https://criticallegalthinking.com/2019/07/12/
hannah-arendt-right-to-have-rights (describing Arendt’s claim that the “right to have
rights” requires national citizenship to “protect” those rights).
3 See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 447,
452 (2000).
4 J.G.A. Pocock, The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times, in THEORIZING
CITIZENSHIP (1995); see also ELIZABETH F. COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS 100–05 (2009) (citing Pocock’s comparison and explaining how the Roman
conception of citizenship helps inform the “genealogy of liberal citizenship”).
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Nations are comprised of political communities whose members
become bearers of important rights and burdens. Whether a person is
considered inside or outside the political community is consequential.
Dividing the benefits and burdens of citizenship by immigration status
is common, and it is not subject to the same scrutiny as racial classifications, even if the categories often overlap for Asians and Latinos.
Who is a member of the political community in the United States?
What barriers to inclusion do immigrants and other racial minorities
face when considered outsiders to this political community?
Elsewhere, I have written that citizenship is broader than political
belonging.1 It can include political, social, economic, and legal dimensions. Yet many theorists say political rights are the sine qua non of
citizenship and that political rights ought to be reserved for citizens.2
To other theorists, citizenship consists of membership in a political
community and includes both rights and participation.3 J.G.A.
Pocock’s classic definition of citizenship contrasted Aristotle’s ancient
Greek notion of citizenship as direct participation in the polis with a
Roman definition of citizenship based on rights.4 Political participation occurs through individual voting and representation by elected
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officials.5 The focus of this Essay is political representation, wherein
members of Congress cast votes on behalf of the people in their districts. Representation permits people who cannot vote, or who do not
vote, to have their voices heard.6 Elected representatives are obligated to look out for all of the people in their district, regardless of
citizenship status. Political theorists base this universal representation
on the notion that legislators represent the public interest, not merely
the interests of voting constituents.7 Also, since the decisions of representatives affect citizens’ and noncitizens’ interests, theorists believe it
would be coercive to bind noncitizens to decisions made without their
input or consent.8
The census count, or enumeration, shapes representation because
the size of the population determines apportionment, or how many
seats are available, and redistricting, or how those seats will be distributed. Representation is intertwined with voting since individual voters
select the officials who fill those seats. Yet representation is distinct
from voting in other ways, including that it is not restricted to citizens.
Considering why immigrants participate in one realm of political life
but not the other motivates the writing of these two Essays, which can
be read together as a status report on political participation for immigrants.9 The “immigrants” and “noncitizens” in this Essay are foreignborn persons who have not attained naturalized citizenship.10 In the
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5 SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 8–9 (1995).
6 See generally Elizabeth F. Cohen, Dilemmas of Representation, Citizenship, and
Semi-Citizenship, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 1047 (2014) (arguing that representatives should
include in their decisionmaking considerations important to those who cannot vote).
7 See id. (advocating for a trustee model of representation that serves the public
interest, as opposed to a delegate model that implements a quid pro quo).
8 Sarah Song describes “affected interests” and the “coercion principle” in her Essay
Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights, 13 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 607, 609–10 (2009). These
principles contravene consent-based theories that posit that a lack of consent to
undocumented immigrants obviates reciprocal obligations. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK &
ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT 116–40 (1985) (arguing that society’s
lack of consent to the presence of undocumented immigrants implies that the Citizenship
Clause should only apply to legal permanent residents).
9 The first Essay in the series concerns voting. See Ming H. Chen & Hunter Knapp,
The Political (Mis)representation of Immigrants in Voting, 92 U. COLO. L. REV. 715 (2021).
10 The terminology used to describe immigrants varies across disciplines and political
valences. For purposes of this Essay, I will refer to “immigrants” and “noncitizens”
interchangeably because both terms are consistent with the legal definitions and because
they are the terms recommended by the U.S. federal government for official
communications since the election of President Joe Biden in 2021. See, e.g., Memorandum
from Troy A. Miller, Senior Off. Performing Duties of Comm’r for U.S. Customs & Border
Prot. on Updated Terminology for CBP Communications and Materials (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/terminology-communications (specifying “noncitizen” and
“migrant” as recommended terms).
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United States, these immigrants are largely Asian and Latino racial
minorities. This Essay argues that both groups have rights to be
counted in the census, and yet they face barriers to political inclusion.
Who gets counted in the census reveals political inequality
because immigrants who lack formal citizenship lack political rights—
to vote, serve jury duty, and hold public office—even if they are supposed to be counted in the census. Many citizens are willing to accept
these political inequalities, even if they seek out equality in other
spheres of life, because they believe politics define the nation.11 However, the political inequality of immigrants is not preordained. There
is lively contestation over the composition of the population count
that defines the boundaries of the political community.12 On the one
hand, noncitizens are persons and should be counted in the total population for the purposes of representation. On the other hand, noncitizens are not part of the voting public so perhaps they should not
factor into the calculation of districts. But denying membership in the
census arena because they are denied voting rights compounds inequality.13 This is particularly disturbing given that the evolution of citizenship reveals a history of exclusion.14 Federal laws initially qualified
citizenship by racial prerequisites. African Americans did not gain citizenship until the Reconstruction Amendments implemented between
1865 and 1870.15 Chinese Americans did not gain citizenship until the
repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943.16 Latinos have been
reclassified as citizens or noncitizens throughout history, and they are
still considered an ethnicity rather than a race on official forms.17
43613-nyu_96-4 Sheet No. 27 Side B
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11 See Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977), in ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, MARYELLEN FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1381 (8th ed. 2016).
12 See infra Part I.
13 Michael Walzer argues in Spheres of Justice that if rights in one sphere of life do not
carry over to other spheres, principles of distributive equality are violated. See LINDA
BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 43,
75–76 (2006) (citing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY 63 (1983)).
14 See generally ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (describing the history of America’s restrictions on
citizenship based on racial, ethnic, and gender distinctions).
15 Martha S. Jones, How the 14th Amendment’s Promise of Birthright Citizenship
Redefined America, TIME (July 9, 2018), https://time.com/5324440/14th-amendmentmeaning-150-anniversary.
16 See Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), repealed by Chinese Exclusion
Repeal Act of 1943 (Magnuson Act), Pub. L. No. 78–199, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (1943).
17 Questions Asked on the Form, U.S. CENSUS 2020, https://2020census.gov/en/aboutquestions.html (June 8, 2021). See generally CLARA E. RODRÍGUEZ, CHANGING RACE:
LATINOS, THE CENSUS, AND THE HISTORY OF ETHNICITY 34–43 (2000) (describing the
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These exclusions violate the principle that, within a community,
persons owe each other associative obligations.18 The Framers specified in the Constitution that the total population of the nation should
be based on the number of persons residing in a state.19 Critical
accounts of the history of the census show there were calls to exclude
people of color and noncitizens in the count of the population. From
1820 through 1950, the Census Bureau at times asked about the citizenship status within a household in some form.20 But the Census
Bureau avoided asking about citizenship on the decennial count of the
total population for the next seventy years until the present day.21
Instead, the Census Bureau reserved a version of the citizenship question for the long-form survey and only administered it selectively to a
sample of the U.S. population in intervening years.22 Studies demonstrate citizenship questions lead to underparticipation from immigrants and their families, resulting in inaccurate population counts.23
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perception of race and ethnicity as “two separate concepts,” and highlighting the impact
that this distinction has on Latinos).
18 See SARAH SONG, IMMIGRATION AND DEMOCRACY (2018) for an argument that
citizens owe noncitizens living in their communities associative obligations by virtue of the
social membership principle (living, working, raising families and building lives in the
United States giving rise to a moral claim for inclusion as political members) and the fair
play principle (contributing through their labor and paying taxes constitutes a scheme of
social cooperation that entitles them to the benefits of that cooperation).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
20 Thomas P. Wolf & Brianna Cea, A Critical History of the United States Census and
Citizenship Questions, 108 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 13–14 (2019); see also Hansi Lo Wang &
Renee Klahr, See 200 Years of Twists and Turns of Census Citizenship Questions, NPR
(Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/23/630562915/see-200-years-of-twists-andturns-of-census-citizenship-questions (listing the particular wording of census citizenship
questions from 1820 through 1950).
21 Compare Wolf & Cea, supra note 20, at 16, 26–28 (noting that the citizenship
question did not appear on the short form decennial sent to all households and only
appeared on the long form sent to a subset of households), with We the People Podcast, Is
Asking About Citizenship on the Census Unconstitutional?, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (May 2,
2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/podcast/is-asking-aboutcitizenship-on-the-census-unconstitutional (featuring an exchange where John Eastman
argued that the short form and long form are “both still census forms” while Tom Wolf
argued that since the long form was only sent to a subset of households, the inclusion of a
citizenship question on the short form is categorically different).
22 Tamara Keith, Fact Check: Has Citizenship Been a Standard Census Question?, NPR
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/27/597436512/fact-check-has-citizenship-beena-standard-census-question; see also History: Questionnaires, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/questionnaires (last visited May
28, 2020) (describing the history of “short-form only” questionnaires).
23 See D’Vera Cohn, What to Know About the Citizenship Question the Census Bureau
Is Planning to Ask in 2020, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Mar. 30, 2018), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/30/what-to-know-about-the-citizenship-questionthe-census-bureau-is-planning-to-ask-in-2020; see also Memorandum from Ctr. for Surv.
Measurement for Assoc. Directorate for Rsch. and Methodology, Respondent
Confidentiality Concerns (Sept. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Memo from Ctr. for Surv.
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FIGURE 1. CENSUS QUESTIONNAIRE24

10/28/2021 11:52:24

Measurement], https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/meetings/2017-11/Memo-RegardingRespondent-Confidentiality-Concerns.pdf (noting, in census pre-testing, widespread
concerns among noncitizen populations about confidentiality, particularly when asked
citizenship and immigration questions).
24 Adapted from Hansi Lo Wang & Renee Klahr, See 200 Years of Twists and Turns of
Census Citizenship Questions, NPR (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/23/
630562915/see-200-years-of-twists-and-turns-of-census-citizenship-questions.
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Contemporary efforts to exclude immigrants from the census
should be understood in the context of this history of political contestation. Part I discusses the challenges of representational equality
amid growing demographic diversity. Part II explores the social, political, and legal barriers used to block representation. Part III explains
the resulting harms to immigrants and racial minorities.
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OF

The United States Constitution mandates that the Census Bureau
count the “whole number of persons in each State” every ten years.25
The Supreme Court has interpreted this command to require equal
representation of all persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.26 In
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court explained that the
Framers carefully considered the inclusion of persons, rather than
voters, during the rebalancing of political power between the North
and the South.27 Specifically, notwithstanding their persistent disenfranchisement until the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, freed
slaves were counted as persons in the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently looked to total population figures when evaluating whether districting maps violate the
Equal Protection Clause by deviating from the elusive ideal of “perfect population equality.”29 Persons, not voters, make up the relevant
population because “[n]onvoters have an important stake in many
policy debates—children, their parents, even their grandparents, for
example, have a stake in a strong public-education system—and in
receiving constituent services, such as help navigating public-benefits
bureaucracies.”30
Congress tasked the Census Bureau with conducting the census
count,31 and the Census Bureau has exercised its mission “to count
everyone once, only once, and in the right place” using a formula of

10/28/2021 11:52:24

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016) (noting that “persons” includes
nonvoters, sustaining Texas’s drawing of State Senate districts based on total population
rather than voter population).
27 See id. at 1127–28.
28 Id. at 1127.
29 Id. at 1124. In Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court reviewed the history of the Equal
Protection Clause and declared that the Framers agreed that the House of Representatives
should represent “people” on the basis of the number of inhabitants. 376 U.S. 1, 13 (1964).
30 Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132. Challengers have argued that “we the people” refers
only to persons who meet basic qualifications for voting. See Hearing on “Counting Every
Person: Safeguarding the 2020 Census Against the Trump Administration’s Unconstitutional
Attacks” Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. 3–4 (2020)
(statement of Dr. John C. Eastman, Professor, Chapman University’s Dale E. Fowler
School of Law) [hereinafter Eastman Testimony]. But Justice Ginsburg responds in
Evenwel: “For every sentence appellants quote from the Court’s opinions, one could
respond with a line casting the one-person, one-vote guarantee in terms of equality of
representation, not voter equality.” 136 S. Ct. at 1131.
31 Congress delegated the task of conducting the census to the Secretary of Commerce,
with the aid of the Census Bureau, “in such form and content as he may determine.”
13 U.S.C. §§ 21, 141(a).
26
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counting persons in the total population.32 Counting everyone is an
immense task because of the sheer number of people living in the
United States. In addition, societal trends and technological limitations make it difficult to locate certain people and encourage their
response.33 Those challenges have only grown with increased demographic diversity: Historically, the geographic distribution of the
voting population did not deviate from that of the total population to
a significant degree, but the two measures have diverged with
increased racial diversity and immigration since the 1960s.34 The lesser
diversity in older census counts explains why policymakers, while
tasked to focus on “persons,” occasionally used the terms persons and
voters interchangeably.35 If most people are citizens, they can vote
and there is no need to specify the noncitizens who cannot. Today,
however, this terminology confusion is highly consequential.
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32 2020 Census: Our Mission to Count Everyone, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 22, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/factsheets/2020/dec/2020-census-ourmission.pdf; Computing Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
topics/public-sector/congressional-apportionment/about/computing.html (last updated
Mar. 1, 2021).
33 See 2020 Census: Our Mission to Count Everyone, supra note 32; COUNTING THE
HARD TO COUNT IN A CENSUS: SELECT TOPICS IN INTERNATIONAL CENSUSES, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU 1, 5 (2019), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/workingpapers/2019/demo/Hard-to-Count-Populations-Brief.pdf.
34 See Ruth Igielnik & Abby Budiman, The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition
of the U.S. Electorate, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/2020/
09/23/the-changing-racial-and-ethnic-composition-of-the-u-s-electorate (noting that the
non-Hispanic white voter population has proportionally decreased across all states, with
several states—most notably, California, Nevada, Florida, Arizona, and Texas—
experiencing particularly pronounced decreases).
35 Appellants in Evenwel argued that several prior Supreme Court cases supported the
“equal voting power” principle that districts should have equalized eligible-voter
populations, though this conclusion was rejected by the Evenwel Court as an overread of
precedent. 136 S. Ct. at 1130–31.
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VOTING POPULATION

Voting
U.S. Citizens

Census
Noncitizen Residents
(LPR, Temporary, Undocumented)
62% White
12% Black
18% Latino (largest)
6% Asian (fast growing)

A. Changing Demographics
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36 See Abby Budiman & Neil G. Ruiz, Key Facts About Asian Americans, a Diverse
and Growing Population, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2021/04/29/key-facts-about-asian-americans.
37 PEW RSCH. CTR., MODERN IMMIGRATION WAVE BRINGS 59 MILLION TO U.S.,
DRIVING POPULATION GROWTH AND CHANGE THROUGH 2065, 9 (2015).
38 Id. at 9 fig.4.
39 Id. at 10; see also Budiman & Ruiz, supra note 36.
40 2020 U.S. Population More Racially and Ethnically Diverse Than Measures in 2010,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/08/2020united-states-population-more-racially-ethnically-diverse-than-2010.html (last updated
Sept. 1, 2021).
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Nowhere has the divergence between voters and persons been
more consequential than for immigrants and naturalized citizens, who
are primarily Latinos and Asian Americans.36 The Pew Research
Center estimated that “without any post-1965 immigration, the
nation’s racial and ethnic composition would be 75% white, 14%
[B]lack, 8% Hispanic and less than 1% Asian.”37 Instead, after extensive immigration from Latin America and Asia, by 2015 the population was 62% white, 12% Black, 18% Hispanic (Latino) and 6%
Asian.38 Latinos are the largest foreign-born group in the United
States; Asians are now the fastest growing foreign-born group and are
projected to surpass the foreign-born Latino population by 2055.39
The 2020 census shows the continued trend of the U.S. population
becoming more racially and ethnically diverse.40
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The growing immigrant and newly naturalized populations hold
electoral significance. In particular, Latinos are concentrated in states
with electoral significance. Data from the Pew Research Center shows
that the nation’s largest Latino populations are in California, Texas,
Florida, and New York.41 The two states with the greatest number of
Latinos, California (15.6 million) and Texas (11.5 million), are among
the most populous and delegate-rich states in the country.42 Major
Latino populations are also dispersed around the country. Florida’s
5.7 million Latinos constitute the third-largest state Latino population
in the country.43 While Latino voters hold a range of political preferences, based on an Elections Eve Poll conducted by Latino Decisions
in 2020, Latino voters preferred the 2020 Democratic candidate Joe
Biden by an overwhelming 44% margin.44 Despite the media narrative that Latinos moved significantly toward the Republican Party
during the 2020 general election, there remained a strong preference
for the Democratic Party among Latinos in numerous swing states
that influenced the election result.45
Asian American voters are becoming an increasingly significant
electoral block as well. The political heterogeneity of Asian American
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41 Jens Manuel Krogstad, Hispanics Have Accounted for More than Half of Total U.S.
Population Growth Since 2010, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 10, 2020), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/10/hispanics-have-accounted-for-more-than-halfof-total-u-s-population-growth-since-2010.
42 Id.; Distribution of Electoral Votes, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/
electoral-college/allocation (last updated Mar. 6, 2020).
43 Krogstad, supra note 41.
44 AM. ELECTION EVE POLL, LATINO VOTERS IN THE 2020 ELECTION NATIONAL
SURVEY RESULTS 7 (2020), https://latinodecisions.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/LatinoEE2020-Deck.pdf. Of the states with prominent Latino populations, Latinos in Florida
favored Biden by twenty-one percent, even though the Republican preference among
Cuban voters shrunk that margin as compared to past years. Id. at 6, 8; Carmen Sesin,
Trump Cultivated the Latino Vote in Florida, and It Paid Off, NBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/trump-cultivated-latino-vote-florida-it-paidn1246226.
45 For examples of media reporting on the shift right demonstrated by Latinos, see
Geraldo Cadava, The Deep Origins of Latino Support for Trump, NEW YORKER (Dec. 29,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-scene/the-deep-origins-of-latinosupport-for-trump (reporting on the overall Latino vote for Biden and the importance of
the Arizona vote but emphasizing Trump’s gains among Latinos); John Burnett, How
Texas’ Longtime Democratic and Heavily Latino County Flipped Red, NPR (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/05/931836590/how-texas-longtime-democratic-and-heavilylatino-county-flipped-red (noting that Biden still won Zapata County, “a heavily Latino
county,” but emphasizing Trump’s improved performance); Sesin, supra note 44
(describing how Trump’s gains among Cubans, Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, and Colombians
in Florida led to his victory in Florida). For a more granular and nuanced report on Latino
voter-preference by state, see Holly K. Sonneland, Chart: How U.S. Latinos Voted in the
2020 Presidential Election, AMS. SOC’Y/COUNCIL OF THE AMS. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://
www.as-coa.org/articles/chart-how-us-latinos-voted-2020-presidential-election.
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voters’ partisan affiliations and the relatively low partisan identification historically detracted from Asian American political influence.46
These trends shifted in the 2020 election. Survey data suggests high
voter turnout and favorability towards the Democratic candidate that
helped Democratic candidates win.47 Nationally, NPR reported 70%
of Asian American voters preferred President Biden in the 2020 election.48 Changes in Vietnamese leanings from Republican to Democrat
contributed to this shift.49
The increased immigration since 1965 also has implications for
the importance of citizenship and immigration status in electoral
politics. Efforts to naturalize eligible immigrants, and then to register
newly naturalized voters, are enhancing the political power of foreignborn voters. According to a Pew Research Center report, naturalized
citizens accounted for 10% of the electorate in 2020.50 The majority of
this cohort of naturalized voters are either Latino (34%) or Asian
(31%).51
Persistent undercounting will also diminish the political influence
of racial groups. The racial groups with the largest undercounting in
the census are the Black and Latino communities,52 and Latinos and
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46 See ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL & TAEKU LEE, WHY AMERICANS DON’T JOIN THE PARTY:
RACE, IMMIGRATION, AND THE FAILURE (OF POLITICAL PARTIES) TO ENGAGE THE
ELECTORATE (2011) (describing both low partisan identification and heterogenous
political viewpoints among Asian Americans and Latinos); KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN,
JANE JUNN, TAEKU LEE & JANELLE WONG, INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POL. &
SOC. RSCH., NATIONAL ASIAN AMERICAN SURVEY (2008) https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/31481 (providing statistical summaries of low Asian American
partisan identification and high heterogeneity).
47 See AM. ELECTION EVE POLL, ASIAN AMERICAN VOTERS IN THE 2020 ELECTION 8,
21, 23 (2020), https://latinodecisions.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/AAPI-EE2020Deck.pdf (detailing large margins of Asian American support in the Georgia 7th District
for Democratic candidates in extremely close Presidential, Senate, and House races).
48 Understanding the 2020 Electorate: AP VoteCast Survey, NPR, https://www.npr.org/
2020/11/03/929478378/understanding-the-2020-electorate-ap-votecast-survey (last updated
May 21, 2021).
49 See Anh Do, Young Vietnamese American Progressives Lead a Generational Split
with Conservative Elders, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
california/story/2020-11-02/vietnamese-american-progressive-movement-backs-bidencampaign.
50 ABBY BUDIMAN, LUIS NOE-BUSTAMANTE & MARK HUGO LOPEZ, PEW RSCH. CTR.,
NATURALIZED CITIZENS MAKE UP RECORD ONE-IN-TEN U.S. ELIGIBLE VOTERS IN 2020,
at 5 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/02/
GMD_2020.02.26_Immigrant-Eligible-Voters.pdf. The naturalized share of the electorate
could have been even larger, if not for the additional barriers to naturalization. See
generally IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., DENYING THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICIZATION
OF THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS AS A NOVEL FORM OF VOTER SUPPRESSION (2020).
51 BUDIMAN ET AL., supra note 50, at 7.
52 Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Undercount and Overcount in the 2010 Census,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 22, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
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Asian Americans sometimes confront language barriers.53 These
racial groups overwhelmingly vote Democratic.54 Additionally,
Latinos skew younger than the average population and consequently
tend to be more progressive.55 In sum, as the share of the electorate
occupied by white American-born voters continues to shrink, the support for Democratic candidates is likely to grow. At the same time,
however, if states receive fewer congressional seats and Electoral
College votes due to census undercounting, the political power of
these groups will be diminished.
B. How Changing Demographics Impact Political Representation
This changing profile of the political community needs to be accurately counted with the goal of representational equality.56 Whereas
the divergence of individuals classified as “persons” or “inhabitants”
of a particular state versus citizens used to be relatively small,57 the
population disparities are now enough to change the allocation of
seats in Congress and state legislatures and to influence redistricting.58
The Constitution and case law set out some guiding principles for capturing these demographic changes.
One principle is that the decennial census requires counting the
total population. Changing from total population to voter population
base, or citizen voting age population (CVAP), excludes children,
some felons, and Native Americans.59 The increased presence of
noncitizen and younger people amplifies the importance of using total
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2010_census/cb12-95.html (estimating a 2.1% and 1.5% undercount of Black and Latino
communities, respectively, in the 2010 Census).
53 The 2020 Census Questionnaire was administered in English and bilingual EnglishSpanish although people could also call by phone or go online to answer the questionnaire
in English as well as twelve other languages. The 2020 Census Speaks More Languages,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
2020/languages.html. Instructions for the census were available in fifty-nine non-English
languages, but not the questionnaires. Language Support, U.S. CENSUS 2020, https://
2020census.gov/en/languages.html (last visited May 22, 2021).
54 See supra notes 36–48 and accompanying text.
55 Loren Collingwood, Matt A. Barreto & Sergio I. Garcia-Rios, Revisiting Latino
Voting: Cross-Racial Mobilization in the 2012 Election, 67 POL. RSCH. Q. 632, 632 (2014).
56 See, e.g., Janai Nelson, Counting Change: Ensuring an Inclusive Census for
Communities of Color, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2019) (portraying
“representational equality” as a principle which demands that “all residents of the state are
to be counted—and served—as constituents”).
57 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
58 Id.
59 See generally Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, supra
note 32. There are efforts in some states to restore felon voting rights. See Felon Voting
Rights, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (June 1, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx (documenting the current status of felon
voting right restoration by state).
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population as the counting method for purposes of furthering representational equality.
Among immigrants, the census inclusion of dual nationals, green
card holders, temporary visitors, and undocumented immigrants—
without reporting the differentiation of “legal” and “illegal” immigrants—has consequences as well. The distinction between documented and undocumented immigrants is obscured through efforts to
exclude noncitizens from the census. In 2020, President Trump introduced an executive order that would have specifically excluded
undocumented populations from the immigrant count.60 The rationale
for such an exclusion is typically that a representative democracy
derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed, and that U.S.
citizens have not consented to the presence of undocumented immigrants.61 However, Trump’s proposal to include a citizenship question
on the census questionnaire or include only the CVAP in apportionment also threatens to harm the political representation of legal immigrants, whose admission follow immigration laws adopted by
Congress—without giving reasons for their exclusion.
Distinct from the theoretical objection to including undocumented immigrants in the census, there is a practical difficulty in the
counting of undocumented populations: inconsistency in the meaning
of undocumented. As Professor Hiroshi Motomura and immigration
attorney Cyrus Mehta have explained, undocumented status is an
“inconclusive” state.62 Some immigrants are undocumented because
they enter the country without inspection, others overstay their visas,
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60 Excluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census,
85 Fed. Reg. 44,679, 44,680 (July 21, 2020) [hereinafter Apportionment Memo].
61 See, e.g., Eastman Testimony, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that representatives are
meant to represent those “who form the body politic” and thus only eligible voters should
be counted in the census); see also SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 8, at 116–40 (arguing that
society’s lack of consent to the presence of undocumented immigrants implies that the
Citizenship Clause should only apply to legal permanent residents). White House advisor
Kris Kobach also wrote in a note to GOP officials that the absence of a citizenship question
“leads to the problem that aliens who do not actually ‘reside’ in the United States are still
counted for congressional apportionment purposes.” Rachael Bade, Kobach Declines to
Answer Questions About Conversations with Trump About Census, WASH. POST (June 7,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kobach-declines-to-answer-questionsabout-conversations-with-trump-about-census/2019/06/07/da6cb8a6-896c-11e9-b1a8716c9f3332ce_story.html. For a rebuttal, see the prior discussion of affected interests and
the coercion principle, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
62 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 52 (2014); see also Cyrus
Mehta, The Impossible Feat of Determining Who is an “Illegal Alien” Under Trump’s
Unconstitutional Census Executive Order, INSIGHTFUL IMMIGR. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2020),
http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2020/08/the-impossible-feat-of-determining-who-is-an-illegalalien-under-trumps-unconstitutional-census-executive-order.html (“Who is legal or illegal
defies an easy definition.”).

43613-nyu_96-4 Sheet No. 32 Side B

10/28/2021 11:52:24

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-4\NYU402.txt

914

unknown

Seq: 14

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-21

13:04

[Vol. 96:901

and others are removable because they either failed to comply with
other terms of their visa or are removable on other grounds.63
Depending how and when they entered the United States, undocumented immigrants may be able to adjust their status through marriage, a U-visa, or legislative relief.64 Trying to broadly exclude all
categories of undocumented immigrants based on an imprecise legal
category leads to an inaccurate estimate of the size of the population.
This would be detrimental to the communities where they reside since
undocumented immigrants are often ineligible to receive public
benefits.65
FIGURE 3. TOTAL POPULATION

VS.

CVAP

CVAP
U.S. Citizens
(Age 18+)

Total
Population
Under Age 18
Noncitizen Residents
(LPR, Temporary, Undocumented)

10/28/2021 11:52:24

63 Stephen H. Legomsky & David B. Thronson, Immigration and Refugee Law and
Policy 1419 (7th ed., 2019).
64 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (allowing a
naturalization pathway for any person who is married to U.S. citizens or who has obtained
permanent residency “by reason of his or her status as a spouse or child of a United States
citizen who battered him or her or subjected him or her to extreme cruelty”); 8 CFR
§ 245.24 (2021) (describing federal regulations governing U-Visa adjudications).
65 See infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text.
66 Advocates for limiting birthright citizenship include former President Trump,
conservative members of Congress, and the think tank the Heritage Foundation. See, e.g.,
Hans A. von Spakovsky, Birthright Citizenship: A Fundamental Misunderstanding of the
14th Amendment, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/
immigration/commentary/birthright-citizenship-fundamental-misunderstanding-the-14thamendment.
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Attempts to exclude noncitizens from political life have taken
many forms. In the last few years, there have been attempts to limit
birthright citizenship,66 exclude noncitizens from voting in local elec-
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tions,67 narrow the definition of constituents on the citizenship test,68
and strip naturalized citizenship without due process.69 Trying to omit
noncitizens from the census was a defining feature of the 2020 decennial count. These contests over citizenship suggest that the boundaries
of the political community are not settled. Two related episodes that
illustrate the battle are further elaborated in Part II: the inclusion of a
citizenship question on the census that would impose barriers to representation, in Section II.A, and litigation to change the official
formula used to determine total population, in Section II.B.
II
BARRIERS

TO

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

OF

IMMIGRANTS

Part II of this Essay describes why inaccurate counting of immigrants and naturalized voters in the census jeopardizes representational equality. Section II.A describes the social and political barriers
to count immigrants and racial minorities which arise under existing
census techniques.
A. Social and Political Barriers to Representation
The census routinely undercounts immigrants and racial minorities, especially those who live in mixed-status households or households that contain both noncitizens and citizens. This is because
immigrants and racial minorities, like other vulnerable populations,
are hard to enumerate and are dissuaded from participation.
According to Census Bureau outreach materials, enumeration is especially challenging when “language barriers, low literacy, and lack of
43613-nyu_96-4 Sheet No. 33 Side A
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67 State measures to restrict noncitizen voting passed in Alabama, Colorado, and
Florida in 2020. See Patty Nieberg, Colorado, Two Other States Pass Amendments
Clarifying that “Only Citizens” Can Vote, COLO. SUN (Nov. 8, 2020), https://
coloradosun.com/2020/11/08/amendment-76-colorado-passes.
68 The 2020 Version of the Civics Test, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 12,
2020), https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/2020test; see also Steven Lubet, Trump’s New
Citizenship Test Is Full of Conservative Bias—and Dotted with Mistakes, POLITICO (Dec. 3,
2020, 09:40 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/03/trumps-newcitizenship-test-is-full-of-conservative-biasand-dotted-with-mistakes-442777 (stating that
the answer to the question “Who does a member of the House of Representatives
represent?” was changed from “all people of the state” to “citizens in their [congressional]
district”).
69 See Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Inalienable Citizenship, 99 N.C.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 22–34) (on file with the New York University
Law Review) (describing denaturalization, citizenship revocation, and denial efforts by the
Trump administration); Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, Litigating
Citizenship, 73 VAND. L. REV. 757, 799–802 (2020) (arguing that heightened levels of due
process are constitutionally required in citizenship cases); Cassandra Burke Robertson &
Irina D. Manta, (Un)Civil Denaturalization, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 402, 454–60 (2019)
(describing procedural due process deficiencies of civil denaturalization).
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internet access” hinder participation.70 These social barriers can be
compounded for poorer populations that are hard to locate or contact,
as with groups that are highly mobile or who live in housing units that
are not in the Census Bureau’s address list.71
In addition, a political climate that is increasingly hostile to immigrants and rising immigration enforcement generates a lack of trust in
the federal government.72 Skepticism of the federal government translates into a greater reluctance to be counted among Asians, Latinos,
and immigrant communities in general.73
1. Undercounting Immigrants
As previously explained, the Census Bureau has avoided putting
a question about citizenship on the decennial form for the past forty
years, from 1960–2000.74 This is due to the longstanding belief of
Census Bureau officials that “any effort to ascertain citizenship will
inevitably jeopardize the overall accuracy of the population count,”75
because “the group being counted perceive[s] [the] possibility of the
information being used against them.”76 The effect was likely magnified in the political climate created by the Trump administration.77
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70 MARYANN M. CHAPIN, JENNIFER KIM, JULIA LOPEZ & JUDY BELTON, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 2020 CENSUS: COUNTING EVERYONE ONCE, ONLY ONCE, AND IN THE RIGHT
PLACE 6 (2018), https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/meetings/2018-11/chapin-hard-tocount.pdf.
71 See Jaboa Lake, Jae June Lee, Meghan Maury & Cara Brumfield, Count People
Where They Are: Census Miscounts Undermine Essential Funding for Homelessness
Prevention, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/poverty/reports/2020/10/05/491122/count-people-where-they-are.
72 See GAIL WADSWORTH, ED KISSAM, CINDY QUEZADA & JO ANN INTILI, SAN
JOAQUIN VALLEY HEALTH FUND, TROUBLED REFLECTIONS: LATINO IMMIGRANTS’
THINKING ABOUT CENSUS 2020 24–25 (2019), https://www.shfcenter.org/assets/SJVHF/
SJVCRP_Troubled_Reflections_022719.pdf (reporting on survey responses and focus
group discussions that indicate a lack of trust in the federal government).
73 Id. at 25; see also Memo from Ctr. for Surv. Measurement, supra note 23 (reporting
concerns about the misuse of Census data, especially among the Latino community); Jose
A. Del Real, When It Comes to the Census, the Damage Among Immigrants Is Already
Done, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/supreme-courtcitizenship-census-immigrants.html.
74 The majority of the twenty-three decennial censuses conducted since 1790 asked at
least some of the population about their citizenship or place of birth. See Dep’t of Com. v.
New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561–62 (2019). The citizenship question has since been
included in intervening years in the American Community Service, a more detailed
demographic survey that is administered to a sample of the total population.
75 Fed’n for Am. Immigr. Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D.D.C. 1980).
76 Id.
77 Hansi Lo Wang, Immigration Hard-Liner Files Reveal 40-Year Bid Behind Trump’s
Census Obsession, NPR (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/15/967783477/
immigration-hard-liner-files-reveal-40-year-bid-behind-trumps-census-obsession
(describing the Trump administration’s efforts to crack down on undocumented
immigrants through the census).
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In August 2018, a Census Bureau study conducted in response to
a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) request concluded that “adding a
citizenship question to the 2020 Census would lead to lower selfresponse rates in households potentially containing noncitizens,
resulting in . . . a lower-quality population count.”78 Before the completion of this study, however, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross
decided to announce reinstatement of the citizenship question in a
March 2018 memorandum.79 Instead, the administrative record on
which Secretary Ross based his decision consisted of the DOJ’s original letter requesting reinstatement of the citizenship question and
several Census Bureau memoranda analyzing potential effects of reinstatement.80 A 2019 study estimated that this would have resulted in a
twelve percent reduction in the Latino population, or six million
Latinos, from the numbers reported in the 2010 census.81
FIGURE 4. HISPANICS WITH NO CITIZENSHIP ANSWER
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY

ON THE

2017

10/28/2021 11:52:24

78 See J. David Brown, Misty L. Heggeness, Suzanne M. Dorinski, Lawrence Warren &
Moises Yi, Understanding the Quality of Alternative Citizenship Data Sources for the 2020
Census 54 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper CES 18-38, 2018).
79 Letter from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., to Karen Dunn Kelley, Under Sec’y for
Econ. Affs., Re: Reinstatement of the Citizenship Question on the 2020 Decennial Census
Questionnaire (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2018-0326_2.pdf.
80 Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2564 (describing the administrative record submitted by
the government supporting its decision to reinstate the citizenship question).
81 MATTHEW A. BAUM, BRYCE J. DIETRICH, REBECCA GOLDSTEIN & MAYA SEN,
SHORENSTEIN CTR., ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF ASKING ABOUT CITIZENSHIP ON THE
U.S. CENSUS 2–4 (2019).
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2. Citizenship Question on the Census: New York v. Department of
Commerce

10/28/2021 11:52:24

82 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHY WE CONDUCT THE DECENNIAL CENSUS (2020),
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/why.html.
83 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
84 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). There were six additional lawsuits challenging
the census question on Administrative Procedure Act (APA) procedural grounds, plus a
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) lawsuit on racial
intent. 2020 Census Litigation, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/
issues/gerrymandering-fair-representation/fair-accurate-census/2020-census-litigation (last
visited June 3, 2021); MALDEF Sues Trump Administration Over Citizenship Data
Collection, MALDEF (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.maldef.org/2019/09/maldef-sues-trumpadministration-over-citizenship-data-collection.
85 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 515.
86 Id. at 660.
87 Id. at 679.
88 Anita Kumar & Caitlin Oprysko, Trump Abandons Effort to Add Citizenship
Question to Census, POLITICO (July 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/11/
trump-expected-to-take-executive-action-to-add-citizenship-question-to-census-1405893.

43613-nyu_96-4 Sheet No. 34 Side B

Undercounting minority populations compromises the integrity
of data that is used for many vital purposes, including academic
research, policy analysis, reapportionment, and distribution of public
benefits.82 Secretary Ross’s and President Trump’s justifications for
seeking citizenship information ran contrary to the goals of the
Census Bureau and researchers who recognized the harms of inaccurate data. Even if it might like to have more granular data on documentation status, the Census Bureau stated that this goal could be
satisfied in a “less costly, more effective, and less harmful manner,”
such as statistical sampling or the use of administrative records.83
Ultimately, the Trump administration’s attempt to reject established conventions and instead include a citizenship question on the
census questionnaire sent to all households proved unsuccessful. In
New York v. Department of Commerce,84 the Census Bureau argued
against the DOJ’s assertion that the citizenship question was
requested for the purpose of enforcing the Voting Rights Act of
1965.85 The Supreme Court agreed with lower courts that this explanation was pretextual.86 The Court left open the possibility of adding a
citizenship question to the census if it could be done in a manner consistent with the reasoned decisionmaking requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.87 However, the Trump administration
abandoned its efforts to reintroduce the citizenship question given the
impending deadline to get the census forms printed in time for the
2020 census administration.88
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3. Executive Order on Collecting Information (2019)
In the same week that the Supreme Court struck down the Trump
administration’s effort to include a citizenship question on the census,
President Trump issued an executive order that would provide an
alternative means of obtaining information about citizenship status.
Executive Order 13880, Collecting Information About Citizenship
Status in Connection with the Decennial Census (2019 Order),89
ordered that “all executive departments and agencies . . . provide the
Department [of Commerce] the maximum assistance permissible, consistent with law, in determining the number of citizens and noncitizens
in the country, including any access that the Department may request
to administrative records that may be useful in accomplishing that
objective.”90 The information would be used for a variety of purposes.91 The officially stated justifications were to: (1) further the
understanding of the effects of immigration, (2) evaluate proposals to
change public benefit eligibility rules, (3) help achieve a more reliable
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89 Exec. Order No. 13880, Collecting Information About Citizenship Status in
Connection with the Decennial Census, 84 Fed. Reg. 33821 (July 11, 2019) [hereinafter
2019 Order].
90 Id. The 2019 Order directs particular agencies to makes specific efforts to maximize
data sharing including: (i) Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services—National-level file of Lawful Permanent Residents,
Naturalizations; (ii) Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement—F1 & M1 Nonimmigrant Visas; (iii) Department of Homeland Security—
National-level file of Customs and Border Arrival/Departure transaction data; (iv)
Department of Homeland Security and Department of State, Worldwide Refugee and
Asylum Processing System—Refugee and Asylum visas; (v) Department of State—
National-level passport application data; (vi) Social Security Administration—Master
Beneficiary Records; and (vii) Department of Health and Human Services—CMS
Medicaid and CHIP Information System. Id. at 33824.
91 In Evenwel v. Abbott, the Supreme Court left open the question whether “States
may draw districts to equalize voter-eligible population rather than total population.” 136
S. Ct. 1120, 1133 (2016). Some states, such as Texas, have argued that “jurisdictions may,
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, design districts using any population
baseline—including total population and voter-eligible population—so long as the choice
is rational and not invidiously discriminatory.” Id. at 1126. Missouri passed a ballot
measure permitting use of eligible voters rather than total population in November 2020.
See SHRUTI BANERJEE & NAILA AWAN, HOW STATES AND THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
ARE WORKING TO EXCLUDE MILLIONS FROM POLITICAL REPRESENATION AND REDUCE
BLACK AND BROWN POLITICAL POWER (2020), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/
2020-10/How%20States%20and%20the%20Trump%20Administration%20Are%
20Working%20to%20Exclude%20Millions%20from%20Political%20Representation%
20and%20Reduce%20Black%20and%20Brown%20Political%20Power.pdf; Yurij
Rudensky & Gabriella Limon, Missouri Amendment 3 Passed, What Does that Mean for
Redistricting?, BRENNAN CTR. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/missouri-amendment-3-passed-what-does-mean-redistricting. Whether
that approach is permissible will be resolved when more states propose districting plans
based on voter-eligible population and litigation similar to United States v. Alabama
ensues. See also infra notes 136–41.
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count of undocumented immigrants, and (4) allow “States to design
State and local legislative districts based on the population of votereligible citizens.”92
The New York v. Department of Commerce litigation left open
the possibility that citizenship status could be determined by the inclusion of a citizenship question, contingent on sufficient reasoning, or by
data collection through administrative records. Yet, despite the qualifier that information collection must be “consistent with law,” many of
the rationales for the 2019 Order depart from approved uses of census
data under existing law. For example, rationales two and three that
would use information collected to restrict public benefits or facilitate
immigration enforcement actions would go beyond the mission of the
Census Bureau. Rationale four refers to redistricting and demonstrates a clear link between the government’s prior attempts to collect
information about citizenship with reapportionment or redistricting
goals that had been hidden under subterfuge in the New York v.
Department of Commerce litigation. Although the 2019 Order did not
explicitly say that citizenship data would be used to change the
formula for reapportionment by excluding noncitizens who are ineligible to vote, a regulatory notice filed with the 2019 Order intimates
that it would be used in this way.93
B. Legal Barriers to Representation

92

10/28/2021 11:52:24

2019 Order, supra note 90, at 33822–23.
Tierney Sneed, Feds Producing Data for States to Do Anti-Immigrant Redistricting
Overhaul, TALKING POINTS MEMO (July 15, 2019), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/
citizenship-data-states-redistricting-bureau-directed-data (linking to a regulatory notice
stating that, in the absence of a citizenship question on the census, the Census Bureau was
directed to produce Citizenship Voting Age Population information prior to April 1, 2021
that states may use in redistricting). Sneed argues that “[i]f the Census Bureau does give
the states data on citizenship for redistricting, the next step would be for a state or a local
jurisdiction to then draw its districts using CVAP rather than total population.” Id. See
infra text accompanying notes 115–17 for a discussion of the Trump memorandum to
exclude aliens in 2020.
94 See Hansi Lo Wang, Immigration Hard-Liner Files Reveal 40-Year Bid Behind
Trump’s Census Obsession, NPR (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/15/
967783477/immigration-hard-liner-files-reveal-40-year-bid-behind-trumps-censusobsession.
93
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The aspiration to shrink the eligibility of noncitizens for census
enumeration through a contraction of the total counted population
would pose a formal means of achieving what the functional barriers
aimed to accomplish. If successful, it would eliminate political representation for noncitizens. Excluding immigrants through the adoption
of CVAP has been an ambition of conservative legal activists for many
years.94 President Trump’s effort in 2020 can be understood as the
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continuation of a “long-simmering battle over the reallocation of
political representation.”95
1. Limiting Total Population to CVAP: Evenwel v. Abbott

95

10/28/2021 11:52:24

Justin Levitt, Citizenship and the Census, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2019).
136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
97 Id. at 1125.
98 See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Hispanic Bar Association, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940), 2015 WL 5731667; Brief of
Direct Action for Rights and Equality (DARE), et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940), 2015 WL 5719754; Brief of the
Children’s Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct.
1120 (No. 14-940), 2015 WL 5719751.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
100 Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1128 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1866)).
Other members of the House including Representative Conkling and Representative Ward
96
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Federal and state legislatures have on occasion sought to change
the formula for reapportionment from total population to CVAP. The
legal terrain for these efforts is laid out in the 2016 Supreme Court
case Evenwel v. Abbott.96 In Evenwel, citizen voters in a Texas district
challenged Texas election officials’ use of total population in apportionment as diluting their votes in relation to voters in other Senate
districts, in violation of Article I, Section 2 and the Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 2.97 Appellants sought an injunction barring use
of the existing Senate map in favor of a map that would equalize the
voter population in each district. Amicus briefs in opposition were
filed on behalf of immigrants, prisoners, and children who would be
excluded from the total population count by a shift to eligible voters.98
While its ruling upheld the principle of “one person, one vote,” the
Court explicitly left open the question of whether CVAP could be
used since the Constitution neither compels nor forbids it.
However, the Supreme Court’s opinion explains that constitutional text, history, and precedent show that this issue was considered
by the drafters and other courts, who reached the conclusion that total
population was deemed to better achieve representational equality.
The Fourteenth Amendment commands: “Representatives shall be
apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed.”99 The Evenwel decision highlights the
statements of Representative James Blaine at the time of the amendment’s enactment, that “no one will deny that population is the true
basis of representation; for women, children, and other non-voting
classes may have as vital an interest in the legislation of the country as
those who actually deposit the ballot.”100 The Evenwel decision also
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agreed and noted that restricting the population count to voters would exclude four-fifths
of the total population. Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE , 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358, 434 (1866)).
101 Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE , 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766–67 (1866)).
102 Id. at 1132.
103 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13 (1964); id. at 1128.
104 See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 11; see also Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1147–49 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (arguing in favor of the regional advantage incentive).
105 See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 6; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 573–74 (1964)
(noting the absence of Founders’ intent to establish an apportionment system for state
legislatures); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963) (same).
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quotes Senator Jacob Howard from the opposite chamber: “[The]
basis of representation is numbers . . . . The committee adopted numbers as the most just and satisfactory basis, and this is the principle
upon which the Constitution itself was originally framed, that the basis
of representation should depend upon numbers . . . . Numbers, not
voters; numbers, not property.”101 Moving from text to history, the
Court further explains that basing legislative apportionment on voting
age population, and by implication CVAP, “would upset a wellfunctioning approach to districting that all 50 States and countless
local jurisdictions have followed for decades, even centuries.”102 The
opinion also takes note of Wesberry v. Sanders, an earlier Supreme
Court case which held that the method used to allocate House seats
applies to state legislative seats as well: “The debates at the
[Constitutional] Convention make at least one fact abundantly clear:
that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent
‘people’ they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number
assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of
the State’s inhabitants.”103
Although Evenwel’s endorsement of total population counting
was unanimous in the Supreme Court, litigants disputed this interpretation of the Constitutional requirements for representational
equality. They instead argued that the Framers selected total population for allocating House seats to states because of federalism concerns such as a state expanding its franchise in an attempt to increase
its tax base or gain regional advantage in the newly formed nation.104
In their view, the Constitution pronounces nothing about allocating
seats within state legislatures.105
Notwithstanding Evenwel and other precedent, the federal government during the Trump administration persisted in trying to shrink
the population count. One of the more dramatic revelations of the
New York v. Department of Commerce litigation was that the
Republican Party worked with Thomas Hofeller, a political strategist
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who had previously commented on the use of the CVAP to comply
with the federal “one person, one vote” standard.106
In a study conducted for the purpose of analyzing the prospects
of using citizenship data to achieve favorable electoral districts,
Hofeller noted that the Supreme Court’s then-pending adoption of
the use of total voting age population in Evenwel might limit the
ability to use citizenship data to their advantage, though he considered
use of CVAP still an open question.107 After acknowledging the fundamental importance of party control to skew redistricting, Hofeller
stated that the use of CVAP as the basis for legislative redistricting
would result in a different measure of the geographic distributions of
people that could be exploited through gerrymandering.108 Fundamentally, using CVAP “would be advantageous to Republicans and
Non-Hispanic Whites.”109 However, Hofeller concluded “without a
congressional mandate for the United States Census Bureau to add a
citizenship question to the 2020 Decennial Census form, or such a
mandate from the Supreme Court,” changing the method of legislative apportionment would be “functionally unworkable.”110
Hofeller correctly predicted that the Supreme Court and congressional Democrats would not allow the citizenship question to be
added to the census.111 Still, the judicial records and regulatory notices
associated with the New York v. Department of Commerce litigation
show that the DOJ nevertheless tried, and the Census Bureau
listened.112
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106 THOMAS HOFELLER, THE USE OF CITIZEN VOTING AGE POPULATION IN
REDISTRICTING, COMMON CAUSE 1 (2015), https://www.commoncause.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/2015-Hofeller-Study.pdf. For an overview of Hofeller’s background, see
Hansi Lo Wang, Deceased GOP Strategist’s Daughter Makes Files Public that Republicans
Wanted Sealed, NPR (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/785672201/deceasedgop-strategists-daughter-makes-files-public-that-republicans-wanted-sea.
107 HOFELLER, supra note 106, at 4.
108 Id. at 6, 8.
109 Id. at 9.
110 Id. at 4.
111 Id. at 9 (“A proposal to use CVAP can be expected to provoke a high degree of
resistance from Democrats and the major minority groups in the nation.”).
112 See Census Bureau, Paperwork Reduction Act Program: Information Collection
Request 2020 Census – Enumeration Operations OMB Control Number 0607-1006, at 16,
47–50, available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=
201812-0607-003 (chronicling the Census Bureau’s deliberation of and response to the
proposed addition of a citizenship question).
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2. Executive Order Excluding Immigrants from Apportionment
Base (2020)
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113 See supra Section II.A.3 for a discussion on the 2019 Order on Collecting
Information.
114 Apportionment Memo, supra note 60, at 44,679.
115 Id. at 44,680.
116 Id.
117 Complaint, New York v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-05770 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020). The six
other cases challenging the Presidential Memorandum include Complaint, Common Cause
v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02023 (D.D.C. July 23, 2020); Complaint, Haitian-Ams. United, Inc.
v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-11421-DPW (D. Mass. July 27, 2020); Complaint, City of San Jose v.
Trump, No. 5:20-cv-05167 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2020); Complaint, California v. Trump, No.
3:20-cv-05169-JSC (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2020); Complaint, Useche v. Trump, No. 8:20-cv02225-PX (D. Md. July 31, 2020); and Second Amended Complaint, La Unión Del Pueblo
Entero v. Trump, No. 8:19-cv-02710-PX (D. Md. Aug. 13, 2020).
118 New York v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-05770, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2020).
119 Hansi Lo Wang, 15 States Say Unauthorized Immigrants Should Continue to Count
for Seats in Congress, NPR (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/06/754685703/15states-say-unauthorized-immigrants-should-continue-to-count-for-seats-in-cong.
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Following the loss in Department of Commerce v. New York,
President Trump sought to obtain his desired outcome through two
executive orders. The 2019 Order collecting information through
administrative records has already been described.113 A 2020 executive order named Excluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment
Base Following the 2020 Census (“Apportionment Memo”) redoubled
the effort.114 The Apportionment Memo sought to use the Census
Bureau to differentiate and exclude the undocumented population in
the official census count delivered to Congress. In this memo,
President Trump proclaimed that “it is the policy of the United States
to exclude from the apportionment base aliens who are not in a lawful
immigration status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.”115 He
then directed the Secretary of Commerce “to provide information
permitting the President . . . to carry out the policy.”116
The Apportionment Memo was immediately challenged by a coalition of civil rights groups and state attorneys general, amounting to
at least seven lawsuits in five federal districts.117 The New York litigation in New York v. Trump enjoined the Apportionment Memo in
September 2020.118 In addition, a coalition of fifteen states led by New
York filed a lawsuit to defend the Census Bureau’s longstanding
method of counting noncitizens and citizens alike for apportionment
purposes.119 Attorneys for the coalition, headed by the New York
State Attorney General’s office, were prompted in part to intervene
due to comments from U.S. Attorney General William Barr which
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indicated hesitation about deferring to the Census Bureau’s chosen
method of counting total population.120
The Supreme Court in December 2020 announced that it would
not review these rulings until the Census Bureau submitted its report
to Congress.121 In the course of related litigation, in January 2021 a
Justice Department attorney stated data irregularities meant the state
population counts needed for reapportioning were not expected until
March 2021.122 The Census Bureau simultaneously announced that it
would no longer seek to follow President Trump’s Apportionment
Memo and would not differentiate the undocumented population in
its eventual report.123 The Apportionment Memo was rescinded by
President Joe Biden on his first day in office.124
Before it was rescinded, the Apportionment Memo also became
the subject of a congressional hearing.125 Conservative legal scholars
testified in support of President Trump that undocumented people
should not be counted in the census.126 In his testimony, Professor
John Eastman claimed that under an originalist reading of the founders’ theories of representation, immigrants were not “residents” of
the states where they reside, “people” and “citizens” were used inter-
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120 Hansi Lo Wang, Do Trump Officials Plan to Break Centuries of Precedent in
Divvying Up Congress?, NPR (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/14/749930756/
do-trump-officials-plan-to-break-centuries-of-precedent-in-divvying-up-congress.
121 Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 530, 537 (2020). Early in 2021, the Census Bureau
announced new deadlines for the delivery of apportionment data (April 30, 2021) and
redistricting data (September 30, 2021). Hansi Lo Wang, Census Numbers for Dividing Up
House Seats Delayed Until April 30, Bureau Says, NPR (Jan. 27, 2021), https://
www.npr.org/2021/01/27/961247853/census-numbers-for-dividing-up-house-seats-delayeduntil-april-30-bureau-says; Census Bureau Statement on Redistricting Data Timeline, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/
statement-redistricting-data-timeline.html.
122 Hansi Lo Wang, Census Bureau Stops Work on Trump’s Request for Unauthorized
Immigration Count, NPR (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/13/956352495/
census-bureau-stops-work-on-trumps-request-for-unauthorized-immigrant-count.
123 Id. Days before the Census Bureau announced it would not follow Trump’s
Apportionment Memo, Inspector General Peggy Gustafson revealed that Census Director
Steven Dillingham had improperly pressured staff to rush the completion of the report on
the undocumented population. Memorandum from Peggy E. Gustafson, Inspector Gen., to
Dr. Steven Dillingham, Census Bureau Dir., Regarding Request for Information Pursuant
to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.oig.doc.gov/
OIGPublications/OIG-21-019-M.pdf.
124 Exec. Order No. 13986, 86 Fed. Reg. 7015 (Jan. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Biden
Executive Order].
125 Counting Every Person: Safeguarding the 2020 Census Against the Trump
Administration’s Unconstitutional Attacks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Reform, HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM (July 29, 2020), https://
oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/counting-every-person-safeguarding-the-2020census-against-the-trump.
126 See, e.g., Eastman Testimony, supra note 30.
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changeably, and “we the people” only extended to those who had
expressed “consent” and “allegiance” to the United States as opposed
to immigrants.127 These observations demonstrate, argues Eastman,
that representation in national government was apportioned “only on
that part of the population which comprises or becomes part of the
body politic,” as opposed to on the total number of inhabitants.128
Eastman concludes his testimony by saying that the President’s directive is “long overdue” and the directive should be expanded to include
“non-citizens more broadly, not just non-citizens who are unlawfully
present in the United States.”129 After the congressional hearing, federal legislation was introduced to prevent implementation of the
Apportionment Memo.130
The history behind the Apportionment Memo reveals an attempt
by the federal government to exclude immigrants from political membership. Adopting CVAP would omit legal noncitizens—whom Trump
also sought to exclude in several of his immigration policies—and
young people whose votes generally disfavor older, white majorities.
A system which excludes undocumented immigrants from the census
count would have been more narrowly tailored than leaving out all
noncitizens and nonvoting age persons. But its theoretical foundation
is harder to defend: Whereas business visitors and tourists may not
qualify under regulations as “inhabitants” eligible to be counted on
the basis of their temporariness or their foreign political affiliations,
green card holders and undocumented immigrants living permanently
in the United States arguably have a greater claim to political
membership.

Evenwel remains good law and sets forth a strong defense for
using total population rather than CVAP for the census. The scope of
Evenwel, though, is less settled. The population data provided to
states can be used for both apportionment of congressional representation and for state redistricting.131 Consequently, there have been
analogous challenges to the use of total population in favor of CVAP
in states.
127
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Id. at 9–10, 12.
Id. at 11–12.
129 Id. at 12. See also We the People Podcast, supra note 21.
130 H.R. 7724, 116th Cong. (2020) (“To prohibit the use of Federal funds to implement,
administer, or enforce the Presidential Memorandum on Excluding Illegal Aliens From the
Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census.”).
131 See About Congressional Apportionment, U.S. C ENSUS B UREAU , https://
www.census.gov/topics/public-sector/congressional-apportionment/about.html (last
updated Feb. 10, 2021).
128
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Most significantly, Alabama sought to restrict eligibility for political representation to CVAP.132 In Alabama v. United States
Department of Commerce, the state of Alabama and Representative
Mo Brooks (R-Ala.) argue that the current system of apportioning
congressional seats gives an unfair electoral advantage to states with
more undocumented immigrants and will (1) deprive Alabama of its
“rightful share of political representation” and (2) cause the state to
lose a congressional seat and an electoral vote to a state with a higher
number of undocumented individuals.133 The State contends that
counting undocumented immigrants violates the Constitution’s provisions governing congressional apportionment and the electoral college, as well as the federal government’s constitutional duty to
conduct an “actual Enumeration” of the population.134 Alabama
seeks to bar the Census Bureau from pursuing a total population
count for apportioning congressional seats and electoral votes and to
declare unconstitutional any apportionment of seats and votes based
on total population. The case is still pending at the time of this writing.
In the 2020 election, Missouri voters approved an amendment to
their state constitution that stated legislative districts shall “be drawn
on the basis of one person, one vote,” which Missouri officials interpreted as using CVAP.135 So far there is no litigation, but policy developments since Evenwel make a change from total population to
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132 For a general overview of recent litigation filed by Alabama against the Department
of Commerce and the Census Bureau over apportionment policies, see Alabama v. United
States Department of Commerce Court Case Tracker, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/alabama-v-united-states-departmentcommerce (last updated May 4, 2021).
133 Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., No. 2:18-cv00772 (N.D. Ala. May 23, 2018); see also Tara Bahrampour, The Census Citizenship
Question Failed. But Alabama Is Seeking to Exclude Undocumented Immigrants in
Apportioning Congressional Seats, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/the-census-citizenship-question-failed-but-analabama-lawsuit-seeks-to-exclude-undocumented-immigrants-in-apportioningcongressional-seatsopponents-decry-the-effort-as-unconstitutional-and-an-attempt-byrepublicans-to-normalize-the-concept-with-the-public/2019/08/14/1887f190-b777-11e9b3b4-2bb69e8c4e39_story.html (describing Alabama’s argument as grounded in a “concept
[that] is a radical shift from anything the country has done in the past”).
134 Complaint at 2, Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., No. 2:18-cv-00772.
135 Hansi Lo Wang, A National Fight Over Who Is Counted in Voting Districts May Arise
from Missouri, NPR (Nov. 8, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/06/931908064/a-nationalfight-over-who-is-counted-in-voting-districts-may-arise-from-missouri (describing the
political debate around Missouri’s “one person, one vote” legislative action); see also supra
note 90. There is no litigation as of this writing, in part because it is unlikely Missouri could
compile the necessary data to redistrict without U.S. Census Bureau or ACS population
estimates.

43613-nyu_96-4 Sheet No. 39 Side B

10/28/2021 11:52:24

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-4\NYU402.txt

928

unknown

Seq: 28

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-21

13:04

[Vol. 96:901

CVAP unlikely.136 Notwithstanding the data challenges, Texas,
Arizona, and Nebraska have indicated that they would use citizenship
data to pursue CVAP as the basis for redistricting if this data was provided to them;137 of these states, Texas in 2013 published a report
related to the 2010 reapportionment that estimated the CVAP in
response to the Census Bureau’s decision to remove citizenship information from the long-form questionnaire.138 Each of these states have
increasingly diverse populations under the age of eighteen and stand
to retain existing power by limiting their population count to the
CVAP.139 While 2020 demographic data for CVAP is not available,
demographic disparities in CVAP and total population mean that if
CVAP is used in redistricting by these states, Republican legislatures
would be able to slow official recognition of demographic change.140
4. Other Causes for Undercounting: Immigration Enforcement and
COVID-19 Delays
Against the backdrop of mistrust spilling over from the effort to
include a citizenship question on the census and to restrict the population count, other confounding factors may undermine counting of
immigrants. The federal government’s harsh enforcement efforts
against immigrants starting at the very beginning of the Trump administration deterred census participation.141 Worries about contracting
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136 Notably, the Census Bureau declined to ask about citizenship in 2020, the American
Community Survey was not conducted in 2020, and the Census Bureau has suspended
work on the post-2020 CVAP special tabulation and likely will not resume. Post-2020
Census CVAP Special Tabulation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 30, 2020), https://
www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/voting-rights/cvap/Post-2020CVAP.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2021); Citizen Voting Age Population by Race and
Ethnicity (Feb. 19, 2021), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU , https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/
decennial-census/about/voting-rights/cvap.html (last updated Feb. 19, 2021).
137 T YE R USH , S UZANNE A LMEIDA & K ESHIA M ORRIS , C OMMON C AUSE ,
WHITEWASHING REPRESENTATION: HOW USING CITIZENSHIP DATA TO GERRYMANDER
WILL UNDERMINE OUR DEMOCRACY 17 (2019).
138 See TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, ESTIMATING CITIZENSHIP VOTING AGE POPULATION
DATA (CVAP): ADDENDUM TO DATA FOR 2011 REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS 1 (2013).
139 See generally William H. Frey, The Nation Is Diversifying Even Faster than Predicted,
According to New Census Data, BROOKINGS (July 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/new-census-data-shows-the-nation-is-diversifying-even-faster-than-predicted.
140 See William H. Frey, Trump Puts the Census Citizenship Question Back in Play,
BROOKINGS (July 9, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/07/09/trumpputs-the-census-citizenship-question-back-in-play (concluding that redistricting through a
“‘one voting age citizen/ one vote’ framework” would “dilute the representation of
younger, diverse, and denser populations that comprise larger parts of the nation’s total
population than its voting aged population”).
141 See Lucas Guttentag, Trump Tracker, IMMIG. POL’Y TRACKING PROJECT, https://
immpolicytracking.org/home (last updated June 6, 2021) (cataloguing the over one
thousand immigration policies enacted by the Trump administration); see, e.g.,
Memorandum from Ctr. for Surv. Measurement on Respondent Confidentiality Concerns
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COVID-19 from nonhousehold members, going door-to-door, or getting sick and being unable to procure medical care further exacerbated the mistrust and chilled participation in the 2020 census.142
The Trump administration’s attempts to interfere with the census
count in the midst of the pandemic aggravated the perennial problems
of undercounting. In an average year, census workers engage in outreach to nonresponsive homes. The early stages of the pandemic
presented significant operational obstacles to census administration.143 Some offices closed.144 Hiring of census workers was
delayed.145 The Census Bureau issued a press release indicating that a
“delay or discontinu[ance]” may be necessary.146 Once operations
recommenced, census workers faced additional obstacles. Regardless
of citizenship, social distancing guidelines and the need to quarantine
made individuals more reluctant to open their doors to strangers
during the pandemic and the government needed to recalibrate its
efforts and rely more heavily on online data collection that routinely
leaves out poor and minority communities. Immigrant communities
were especially worried about sickness because of their fears that
testing for the virus or pursuing health care would negatively impact
them in the public charge rule.147
The federal government also attempted to wind down the census
count early, which if successful would have exacerbated an
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(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/meetings/2017-11/Memo-RegardingRespondent-Confidentiality-Concerns.pdf (reporting increased concerns about misuse of
census data in the context of the Muslim ban, the attempted rescission of the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program, and escalated ICE enforcement).
142 See Nick Brown, First Online U.S. Census Kicks Off Amid Coronavirus Fears,
REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-census-kickoff/firstonline-u-s-census-kicks-off-amid-coronavirus-fears-idUSKBN20Z1JH.
143 Trevor Bach, COVID-19 Has Stopped Virtually Everything — Except the U.S.
Census, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/
2020-03-21/the-coronavirus-outbreak-has-stopped-virtually-everything-except-the-uscensus.
144 Id.
145 See id. (noting that the pandemic created inordinate challenges and unforeseen
consequences that led to delay at every stage of the census); Jory Heckman, 2020 Census
Hiring Suspended Until at Least April 1 Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, FED. NEWS
NETWORK (Mar. 20, 2020), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/hiring-retention/2020/03/2020census-hiring-suspended-until-at-least-april-1-amid-coronavirus-pandemic.
146 See Census Bureau Statement on Coronavirus and the 2020 Census, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Mar. 11, 2020), https://2020census.gov/en/news-events/press-releases/statementcoronavirus.html?cid=20412:%2Bcensus%20%2Bcoronavirus:sem.ga:p:dm:en:&utm_
source=sem.ga&utm_medium=utm_campaign=DM:en&utm_content=20412&utm_
term=%2Bcensus%20%2Bcoronavirus.
147 Jeffrey Miron & Erin Partin, Unintended (COVID) Consequences of Tough
Immigration Policies, CATO INST. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.cato.org/blog/unintendedcovid-consequences-tough-immigration-policies.
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undercount. A lawsuit filed by the National Urban League and other
civil rights groups alleged that the administration’s decision to
abandon COVID-19 plans that extend the timeline for counting would
rush the data collection and data processing.148 The “Rush Plan,” as
they called it, would have resulted in a “massive undercount of the
country’s communities of color and the municipalities, cities, counties,
and states where they live.”149 Ultimately, the Department of
Commerce was enjoined “from implementing the [Rush Plan] or
allowing to be implemented any actions as a result of the shortened
timelines in the [Rush Plan], including but not limited to winding
down or altering any Census field operations.”150 The plans were
thwarted by Judge Lucy Koh’s temporary restraining order against the
wind-down plan.151
Setting aside the Trump administration’s explicit attempt to
exclude undocumented people from the apportionment count,
numerous flaws in the scheduling,152 the execution,153 and the questions regarding citizenship154 exacerbated the challenging task of
obtaining a complete and accurate count of the total population. Data
scientists inside and outside of the Census Bureau have expressed
concerns that the resulting data may be unreliable due to these anomalies and irregularities.155
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148 Complaint at 2, Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 2020 WL 4805007 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18,
2020) (No. 20-cv-5799).
149 Id.
150 Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 484 F. Supp. 3d 802, 808 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2020).
151 Id.
152 During oral arguments before the Supreme Court in Trump v. New York, acting
Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall attributed the delays to an earlier injunction issued by a
California court, “and some subsequent issues in processing the data.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 6, Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530 (2020) (No. 20-336), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/20-366_k537.pdf
[hereinafter Trump v. New York Oral Arguments].
153 In a letter sent to Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross on December 2, 2020, the
House Committee on Oversight and Reform described thirteen additional anomalies that
impacted more than 900,000 census records. Letter from Carolyn B. Maloney,
Chairwoman, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, to Wilbur
L. Ross, Jr., Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Com. 3–5 (Dec. 2, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/
sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020-12-02.CBM%20to%20RossCommerce%20re%202020%20Census%20Count.pdf (arguing that “the Trump
Administration is preventing Congress from verifying the scope of these anomalies, their
impact on the accuracy of the Census, and the time professionals at the Census Bureau
need to fix them,” a “dangerous pattern of obstruction with the Census”).
154 See Trump v. New York Oral Arguments, supra note 152, at 86–87 (“[T]he memo
expresses the intent to exclude non-citizens who are here unlawfully . . . . [T]he argument
has revealed . . . [that] it’s going to be very difficult—it’s not going to be particularly
feasible to exclude all of the non-citizens.”) (Kavanaugh, J.).
155 See, e.g., AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N, 2020 CENSUS QUALITY INDICATORS 1–2 (2020);
Hansi Lo Wang, Millions of Census Records May Be Flawed, Jeopardizing Trump’s Bid to
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III
HARMS TO POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF ASIAN,
LATINO, AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES
This Essay has shown that decisions about who is counted in the
census determine whose voices are heard in government. These decisions determine whether immigrants count in the political community.
This Part describes several harms that flow from excluding immigrants
from the political community: altering electoral outcomes, skewing
public benefit distribution, and compromising representational
equality.
A. Electoral Outcomes

10/28/2021 11:52:24

Alter Count, NPR (Dec. 5, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/05/943416487/millions-ofcensus-records-may-be-flawed-jeopardizing-trumps-bid-to-alter-count (reporting on
leaked documents to the House Oversight and Reform Committee).
156 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, How Removing Unauthorized Immigrants from
Census Statistics Could Affect House Reapportionment, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 24, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/24/how-removing-unauthorizedimmigrants-from-census-statistics-could-affect-house-reapportionment; see also Ted
Mellnik & Kate Rabinowitz, Where a Citizenship Question Could Cause the Census to Miss
Millions of Hispanics, WASH. POST (July 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2019/06/06/where-citizenship-question-could-cause-census-miss-millions-hispanicswhy-thats-big-deal; New York v. Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 422, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(“[E]xcluding illegal aliens from the apportionment count could reduce the number of
representatives in States with large immigrant populations . . . .”); Complaint at 11,
Common Cause v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02023, 2020 WL 4280023 (D.D.C. July 23, 2020)
(noting large apportionment consequences resulting from the exclusion of undocumented
immigrants in California, New York, and Georgia).
157 New York v. Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d at 447.
158 Mellnik & Rabinowitz, supra note 156.
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Undercounting the immigrant population would result in lost
U.S. congressional seats for some states and gained seats for others. A
shift from counting the total population to counting only CVAP would
also shift congressional seats. A Pew Research data analysis suggests
that excluding the undocumented population from the census would
lead to lost seats in places where immigrants are concentrated, such as
California, Florida, and Texas.156 Arizona, Florida, Georgia, New
York, or Illinois may also lose some congressional representation.157
Effective gains in seats would be expected in Alabama, Minnesota,
Ohio, and Montana.158
Moreover, since census data is provided at the block level and
includes attributes like age, sex, race, and citizenship, the data could
be used by states for targeted redistricting according to political aims.
Changing districting based on CVAP instead of total population
would tend to benefit older, white, rural, Republican voters because it

43613-nyu_96-4 Sheet No. 41 Side B

10/28/2021 11:52:24

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-4\NYU402.txt

932

unknown

Seq: 32

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

26-OCT-21

13:04

[Vol. 96:901

boosts their share as compared to younger, more racially diverse,
more urban, and more Democratic voters.159 If the CVAP were used
to redraw district lines in Texas, populations in El Paso and the Rio
Grande valley would suffer the greatest representational loss, while
the greatest gains in representation would be in rural and semirural
counties in Central and West Texas.160
This manner of exclusion literally seeks to remove noncitizens
from the body politic, and it does so in violation of the Constitution,
Supreme Court precedent, and settled practice.
FIGURE 5. ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES

OF

EXCLUDING CVAP
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159 See Jowei Chen & Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Democracy’s Denominator, 109
CALIF. L. REV. 1019 (2021).
160 HOFELLER, supra note 107, at 8.
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EXCLUDING CVAP

Economic consequences follow from the use of CVAP as well.
Census data is used to distribute public benefits to states.161 These

10/28/2021 11:52:24

161 In 2020, the Census Bureau prepared to analyze federal programs “to define either
the characteristics of populations served by the program or the characteristics of
governments and organizations eligible to receive funds to provide those services,” to
determine the amount of funds awarded or allocated to recipients, and to monitor and
assess program performance. MARISA HOTCHKISS & JESSICA PHELAN, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, USES OF CENSUS BUREAU DATA IN FEDERAL FUNDS DISTRIBUTION: A NEW
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benefits impact 316 federal programs, including programs targeted at
low-income individuals such as Medicaid (except for emergency care),
the Children’s Health Insurance Program, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and
Supplemental Security Income.162 They impact an additional $1.5 trillion of funds that flow through and to states and local governments in
the form of grants, loans, and loan guarantees.163 Further hindering
equitable distribution of public benefits, federal laws have distinguished between “qualified” and “not qualified” immigrants to determine benefit eligibility, and this distinction would become more
difficult to make if CVAP were introduced.164 The “qualified” immigrant category includes lawful permanent residents, refugees, and
people granted parole by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) such as Cuban and Haitian entrants. Certain abused immigrants, their children, their parents, and survivors of trafficking may
also be qualified to receive public benefits. All other noncitizens,
including undocumented immigrants and others who may be lawfully
present in the United States, are considered “not qualified.”165 Since
removing noncitizens from the census count corresponds to reduced
public benefits for qualified immigrants and for their communities, it
effectively renders those immigrants beyond the reach and responsibility of the government.
The dilution of public resources for immigrants is amplified by
the chilling effects of a regulation under President Trump that
restricted the green card eligibility of some immigrants upon accepting
43613-nyu_96-4 Sheet No. 42 Side B
10/28/2021 11:52:24

DESIGN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (2017), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/
decennial/2020/program-management/working-papers/Uses-of-Census-Bureau-Data-inFederal-Funds-Distribution.pdf. Scholarship on the distribution of federal spending focuses
on Congress and the President. See, e.g., Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William
G. Howell, The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
783, 783 (2010).
162 See ANDREW REAMER, GEO. WASH. INST. PUB. POL’Y, COUNTING FOR DOLLARS
2020: THE ROLE OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS IN THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF
FEDERAL FUNDS 1 (Feb. 2020), https://gwipp.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2181/f/downloads/
Counting%20for%20Dollars%202020%20-%20Comprehensive%20Accounting_Report%
207B%20Feb%202020%20rev.pdf; HOTCHKISS & PHELAN, supra note 161, at 3 (finding
that 132 federal programs relied on the Census Bureau data to distribute $675 billion in
funds during the 2015 fiscal year); TANYA BRODER, AVIDEH MOUSSAVIAN & JONATHAN
BLAZER, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL
PROGRAMS 1, 3 (2015), https://www.nilc.org/issues/economic-support/overviewimmeligfedprograms (focusing on the eligibility of immigrants accessing federal public
benefit programs).
163 REAMER, supra note 162, at 144.
164 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (enacting “Welfare reform”).
165 Id. §§ 401, 403, 431.
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Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019).
Id. (“This final rule amends DHS regulations by prescribing how DHS will
determine whether an alien applying for admission or adjustment of status is inadmissible
to the United States . . . because he or she is likely at any time to become a public
charge.”).
168 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). The statute does
require the consideration of the following factors: age; health; family status; assets,
resources, and financial status; education and skills.
169 Id. § 1601(2).
170 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,296.
171 Complaint at ¶¶ 113, 121–22, New York v. Trump, 20-CV-5770-RCW-PWH-JMF,
2020 WL 4253046 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020).
172 Id. at ¶ 123.
167
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public benefits.166 The rule, enacted at the end of the Trump administration, rationalized this exclusion as consistent with longstanding
rules that disfavor immigrants who were public charges or reliant on
the state for their daily needs.167 The immigration statute excluding
public charges from entry does not define the term “public charge.”168
But in a related statute Congress articulated a national policy that
(1) “aliens” within the Nation’s borders not depend on public
resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities
and the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and (2) “the availability of public benefits do not constitute an
incentive for immigration to the United States.”169 In its revision of
the public charge rule under the Trump administration in 2019, the
DHS reinterpreted the statute to include programs like SNAP,
Medicaid, and housing subsidies which were previously excluded from
the public charge designation.170 The result is to exclude people from
claiming public benefits if they hope to become citizens one day. In
other words, the rule restricts the boundaries of the political community by wealth and burdens the ability of poor noncitizens from
someday becoming citizens.
Moreover, a feedback loop exists between the economic and
political dimensions of the census: the allocation of public resources
spills over into the realm of political representation. In New York v.
Trump, in which litigants challenged the dilution of immigrants’ political power through their exclusion from a census count, a coalition of
states intervening on behalf of the plaintiffs alleged that excluding the
undocumented population from the census would reduce federal
funds to their entire jurisdiction, and not only for immigrants.171 They
also claimed that immigrants and their communities would suffer from
less effective advocacy for future benefits with reduced representation
in Congress and the state legislature, setting in motion a cycle of
diluted public benefits for the people in districts with many
noncitizens.172
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Similar to lost electoral seats, the loss of public benefits is a material harm of excluding noncitizens in the census. The significance of
this spillover from political to economic belonging is that restricting
noncitizen participation in the census extends beyond the sphere of
politics—where some are willing to accept inequalities between citizens and noncitizens—into a sphere where citizenship distinctions
should be less relevant.
C. Representational Harms

10/28/2021 11:52:24

173 See supra Part I for an overview of political community; see also Chen & Knapp,
supra note 9, at 721.
174 See generally Tom R. Tyler, Phillip Atiba Goff & Robert J. MacCoun, The Impact of
Psychological Science on Policing in the United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and
Effective Law Enforcement, 16 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 75 (2015).
175 D’Vera Cohn, How Accurate Will the 2020 U.S. Census Be? We’ll Know More Soon,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/14/howaccurate-will-the-2020-u-s-census-be-well-know-more-soon.
176 Id.
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Beyond the material harms of lost electoral seats and public benefits, the exclusion of noncitizens from the census creates symbolic
harms. As I stated in this Essay and in a related Essay on representation in voting, immigrants are entitled to be part of the political community, even if they lack other rights reserved for U.S. citizens.173
Naturalized citizens have an even greater claim to political community
as full rights bearers and yet are excluded from society because they
bear other markers of disadvantage: being foreign-born, and frequently, being non-native English speakers, racial minorities, and less
acclimated to U.S. politics. Overlooking these claims to representation
undermines democratic legitimacy and disrespects the associative obligations of Americans to noncitizens because noncitizens have not
expressed consent to the persons or positions adopted by elected officials. Studies of procedural justice consistently show that a lack of
trust in decisionmakers can lead to noncompliance or a lack of social
cooperation, which undermines the very goals of a policy.174 In the
specific instance of the census, a Pew Report shows that the percentage of Americans who believed the 2020 census would be accurate declined over the course of the year and differed by race and
ethnicity.175 In November 2020, 65% of Americans expected the
census to be somewhat accurate, down from 68% in June 2020 and
75% in March 2020.176
The exclusion of immigrants from the polity is exacerbated by the
failure to distinguish noncitizens as a broad category of persons from
the narrower category of undocumented immigrants. As a legal
matter, counting the undocumented population is notoriously tricky
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177 See supra text accompanying notes 61–63 (discussing the indeterminacy of
undocumented status).
178 See Brown et al., supra note 78, at 2, 6, 19–20, 39 (concluding that “adding a
citizenship question to the 2020 Census would lead to lower self-response rates in
households potentially containing noncitizens” and explaining incentives to provide an
incorrect answer due to concerns about data being used for enforcement).
179 See supra note 8.
180 Id.
181 For one of many contemporary efforts for data disaggregation, see, for example,
FAQ: Data Disaggregation and Asian Americans, ASIAN AM. ADVANCING JUST., https://
censuscounts.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FAQs-on-Data-Disaggregation-and-AsianAmericans.pdf (last visited June 3, 2021).
182 See infra notes 190–92 and accompanying text. For historical accounts of the politics
of recognition and multiracialism on the census, see, for example, VICTORIA HATTAM, IN
THE SHADOW OF RACE: JEWS, LATINOS, AND IMMIGRANT POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2007); THE NEW RACE QUESTION: HOW THE CENSUS COUNTS MULTIRACIAL
INDIVIDUALS (Joel Perlmann & Mary C. Waters eds., 2002); COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE
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because the definition of unlawful presence is very complicated and
sometimes indeterminate.177 Additionally, undocumented immigrants
may refrain from participation out of fear that their neighborhoods
could experience targeted immigration enforcement or harassment if
the census count reveals their status.178
Moreover, as a theoretical matter, by eliminating undocumented
immigrants from the total population count, the government uses a
consent-based theory to say Americans do not consent to the presence
of undocumented immigrants and neither the government nor
American citizens accept responsibility to represent them or hold
reciprocal obligations.179 Resorting to CVAP takes this argument a
step further by implying that Americans do not consent to any noncitizens being part of their political community: not even documented
immigrants such as lawful permanent residents or temporary visa
holders. This faulty implication results from unexamined assumptions.
It also shows the reach of exclusionary immigration enforcement policies into the everyday affairs of immigrants seeking to integrate into
their political communities. The corollary is also true: noncitizens
whose input or consent is not sought by their representatives are
coerced into supporting policies and positions that may not align with
their own interests.180
It would be fair to ask whether the collection of citizenship data
from the census necessarily excludes noncitizens from the polity. After
all, in other contexts more data is better. Demographers generally
prefer more detailed data collection about population groups.181 Civil
rights advocates usually advocate for data disaggregation and official
recognition as a means of protecting—rather than harming—racial
minority groups.182 However, collecting citizenship data from noncitizens during a period of perceived or actual immigration enforcement
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is risky, so the costs and benefits need to be weighed. The historical
and contemporary examples of federal and state governments seeking
to collect citizenship information has indeed worked to the detriment
of immigrants. Even if the fears of government abuse can be mitigated—for example, by assuring immigrant communities that the collection of citizenship data is motivated by a desire to help, or at least
not harm, or by improving legal safeguards against data sharing with
immigration enforcement—the data is vulnerable to misuse. For
example, some of the risks described in government privacy impact
statements include the possibility that disclosure of sensitive information could lead to an inaccurate immigration status being assigned to
an individual or the data could be used for unauthorized purposes.183
As a matter of accuracy, the census data could be inaccurately linked
with data from DHS and other sources and the individual would not
be able to correct or amend information about them in official
records.184 Ultimately, it is not clear that these risks are justified when
social scientists and statisticians contend there are less risky ways to
produce accurate data about citizenship, such as administering surveys
to smaller groups and relying on statistical sampling to extrapolate the
total population185 or using administrative records that are already
kept by other agencies within certain parameters.186
CONCLUSION
The conclusion suggests several solutions to the problems of representational inequality for noncitizens. Generally, census reports
need to reflect changing demographics to keep up with the Founders’
43613-nyu_96-4 Sheet No. 44 Side B
10/28/2021 11:52:24

ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA (John David Skrentny
ed., 2001).
183 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) IMMIGRATION-RELATED INFORMATION
SHARING WITH U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 10–11 (2019) (offering mitigation mechanisms, but
recognizing that full mitigation is not possible).
184 See id. at 11.
185 See, e.g., Jennifer Van Hook & James D. Bachmeier, How Well Does the American
Community Survey Count Naturalized Citizens?, 29 DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH. 1, 5–15 (2013).
The DHS, the Pew Hispanic Center, and the Center for Migration Studies regularly
produce estimates of the unauthorized foreign population using similar statistical methods.
186 Administrative records from the DHS or other agencies specified in the 2019 Order
could be useful for limited purposes, but they have their own risks of inaccuracy if used to
estimate precise numbers of undocumented immigrants at detailed levels of geography. See
Jennifer Van Hook, Analysis: Why the 2020 Census Doesn’t Need a Citizenship Question to
Count the Undocumented, PBS NEWS HOUR (July 17, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/science/analysis-why-the-2020-census-doesnt-need-a-citizenship-question-tocount-the-undocumented (acknowledging that while administrative records “could help
answer some narrowly defined questions about immigrants and improve national
estimates,” they would likely be insufficient to resolve many other inquiries).
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187 Elizabeth F. Cohen describes this public interest notion as “trusteeship.” Cohen,
supra note 6, at 1058.
188 See Biden Executive Order, supra note 124.
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aspiration of representational equality in a democracy. The need for
the Census Bureau to counter inequality for Black and lower-income
voters is a recognized challenge. Extending the scope of attention to
include countering inequality for the growing immigrant, Asian, and
Latino foreign-born population is also necessary. Indeed, representational equality is more consequential than ever given the rift between
the white majority citizen population and newer communities that
tend to be younger, more racially diverse, and more Democratic.
Beneath the technical details of formulas for enumeration, political leaders and theorists need to expand overly narrow conceptions of
who is considered a member of the political community. They need to
make the case that immigrants and foreign-born citizens are part of
the political community, similar to U.S.-born citizens. This conceptual
shift requires recognizing that representation in a democracy is not
conditioned on a one-to-one translation of voter wishes into policies;
it is based on a broader conception of the public interest and a commitment to representational equality in a democracy.187 Policymakers
who recognize that the total population within their districts includes
immigrants in a variety of legal statuses—ranging from permanent to
temporary, legal to undocumented—will more faithfully embody the
wishes of “we the people.” The restoration by President Biden’s
Census Bureau of the longstanding practice of including noncitizens in
the total population count is a promising step in this direction, but
other challenges persist.188
Congress can prevent the erosion of representational equality by
continuing to use total population when counting the American
people. This metric ensures that immigrants and the noncitizen and
nonvoting population are not excluded from electoral politics. Courts
should stringently review the rationales set forward to justify narrower
schemes of counting, including President Trump’s executive order to
eliminate undocumented immigrants from the count and state-led
efforts to institute citizenship qualifications for political representation. While redistricting is inextricably political, its important implications for equality protections found in the Equal Protection Clause
and Voting Rights Act necessitate rigorous scrutiny.
Another way to bolster noncitizen representation is to mobilize
immigrants and communities with many foreign-born citizens to participate in the decennial enumeration. Maintaining census questionnaires that are fair and do not intimidate participants is a prerequisite
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to attaining a comprehensive and accurate count. Survey data can be
used to mitigate risks to vulnerable communities.189 Information
requests about aggregated data can be limited to avoid creation of
citizen designations at the block level that can then be used improperly for redistricting in Congress and state legislatures. If information
about immigration status is needed for other government purposes,
especially immigration enforcement, it should come from data sources
other than the census. Safeguards should avoid the misuse of data190
or violations of privacy that have brought harm to immigrants in the
past.191
Immigrants are not the same as American citizens, and they do
not have all of the same rights. But representational equality requires
that immigrants be seen as members of the same political community
as other Americans in the United States.
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189 Although the modern Census Bureau and civil rights groups have favored a method
of reserving citizenship and other sensitive questions for statistical sampling only, courts
and conservatives have resisted sampling (as recently as 1999). See MELISSA NOBLES,
SHADES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE AND THE CENSUS IN MODERN POLITICS ix (2000) (“In
January 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of the Census may not use
sampling techniques in determining representational apportionment.”). The Supreme
Court expressed a view that sampling techniques violate the strict text of the Constitution’s
command to count every person. See Dep’t of Com. v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525
U.S. 316, 334–35 (1999). A related view is the idea that counting every person is a civic act
and that using a method that skips over that act amounts to a shortcut that denies sampled
groups the ability to directly participate, though support for this civic-act theory fades
when confronted with the empirical reality that a more accurate account derives from
sampling rather than counting hard-to-reach groups, particularly amidst the availability of
improved administrative records relating to naturalization data. Politicians in Congress
have weighed in on sampling, though their views are muddied by political incentives to
align their views with the projected benefits to their parties.
190 See, e.g., Comment on the 2020 Census Information Collection Request, ACLU
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-2020-census-icr-comment (commenting on a
federal register notice with “serious concerns” regarding block-level CVAP data
production).
191 Historical examples of privacy transgressions include the use of citizenship data
during World War II to intern Japanese Americans and the 2004 sharing of aggregated
totals from the 2000 census to identify Arabs for purposes of DHS enforcement. See Lori
Aratani, Secret Use of Census Info Helped Send Japanese Americans to Internment Camps
in WWII, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/
wp/2018/04/03/secret-use-of-census-info-helped-send-japanese-americans-to-internmentcamps-in-wwii/?variant=116ae929826d1fd3; Lynette Clementson, Homeland Security Given
Data on Arab-Americans, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/30/
us/homeland-security-given-data-on-arab-americans.html. Requests for special tabulations
on sensitive populations made by federal, state, or local law enforcement and intelligence
agencies using protected data now require prior approval from the appropriate associate
director of the government agency.

